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Abstract
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are sensitive to radiation-induced single event upsets (SEUs)
within the configuration memory. Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is a technique commonly used to
mitigate against design failures caused by SEUs. This
paper evaluates the effectiveness and cost of TMR
on two different counter designs in the presence of
SEUs. The evaluation measures the reliability, area
cost, and speed of different TMR styles. The tests
show that when feedback TMR is used with triplicated
clocks, it is possible to to have a counter design which
is insensitive to any single configuration upset.

I Introduction
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are an
attractive hardware design option for many spacebased computing applications. They can be reprogrammed while in orbit to adapt to changing mission needs and allow for design modifications. While
SRAM-based FPGAs offer several advantages for
space-based operations, they are sensitive to single event upsets (SEUs)[1]. SRAM-based FPGAs
are especially sensitive to SEUs within the configuration memory of the device. The configuration
memory defines the operation of the configurable
logic blocks (CLBs), routing resources, input/output
blocks (IOBs), and other FPGA resources and upsets
in the configuration memory can change the operation of the circuit. To operate properly in space,
SRAM-based FPGA circuit designs must anticipate
and mitigate against any configuration SEU which
could alter the design.
Several techniques have been proposed to make
designs reliable in the presence of event upsets.
Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is a technique
commonly used to provide design hardening[2]. The
purpose of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness and cost of different TMR styles in order to im-

prove the reliability of SRAM-based FPGA designs
in the face of single event configuration upsets.

II SEU Simulator
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of TMR, it
is important to identify the number of sensitive configuration bits in a design hardened with each TMR
style. A sensitive configuration bit is a configuration
bit that directly affects the behaviour of the design.
Any single configuration bit that is upset due to radiation will change the behaviour of the design. If a
sensitive configuration bit is upset and the behaviour
of the design changes, we indicate that a failure has
occurred.
A simulator developed at BYU[3] is used to exhaustively test the sensitivity of every configuration
bit of a Virtex V1000 FPGA. This simulator was developed in order to evaluate how sensitive a given design is to configuration SEUs. Based on the SLAAC1V FPGA computing board[4], the simulator places
the design to be tested in two separate Virtex V1000
FPGAs. One of the two FPGAs is targeted for testing, and the second one is used as a ’golden’ design.
During the SEU simulation, every configuration bit
is systematically upset. The outputs of both FPGAs
are fed to a third FPGA. This third FPGA compares
the output from the golden design to the design under test. If there are differences in the outputs, we
know that an error has occurred in the design under
test. This third FPGA communicates this information to a host via a PCI bus.
TMR is used to decrease the sensitivity of a design to single event upsets. The goal of this work is to
evaluate the effectiveness and cost of each TMR style.
Increased reliability from the use of TMR comes at
the cost of greater overhead (in the form of LUTs,
IOBs and routing) and reduced design speed. Each
TMR approach will be evaluated in terms of the
number of sensitive configuration bits, the number

of sensitive configuration bits relative to the amount
of logic used, the overhead required, and the speed
at which the design can run. Also, the use of TBUF
voters in place of LUT voters will be evaluated.

III Baseline Designs

We apply each TMR style on two different counter
designs. The first design is a simple 8-bit incrementer (Figure 1(a)). The second design is a
more complex 8-bit incrementer/decrementer, loadable counter (Figure 1(b)). The performance and
area of the unmitigated designs can be used as a baseline benchmark to measure the cost and effectiveness
of each redundancy method. The first reported baselines are area and speed. Without TMR the simple
incrementer requires only 8 LUTs and can run at 220
MHz. The complex counter consumes 10 LUTs and
operates at 220 MHz.
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IV TMR Techniques
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is a common
technique used to harden circuits to prevent design
failures due to single event upsets (SEUs)[2]. TMR
is able to mask single circuit failures by triplicating
the circuit of interest and voting on the circuit outputs. Several TMR styles are applied to both the
simple and complex counters. The first TMR style
triplicates the counters and uses a single voter (Figure 2). The next style triplicates the voters as well
as the counters (Figure 3). The third method implements TMR on the feedback path of the counters
(Figure 4). We also look at how triplicating the clock
affects all of the previous TMR styles. The results of
the simulations for each TMR design are summarized
in Table 1. It is important to note that in each of
the TMR design, half-latches have been completely
removed[5].

A. TMR with 1 Voter
The first redundancy design triplicates the counters and then votes on the three designs with a single
voter (Figure 2). Table 1 shows that the number of
LUTs used with this style increases dramatically by
a factor of 4. Further, the extra logic provides a
limited increase in reliability. The problem with this
method of hardening is that the voter is a single-point
of failure. Any sensitive configuration bits associated
with the voter will cause the design to fail. Since the
voter uses the same number of LUTs as the original
non-redundant counter, we see no increase in reliability. However, if we apply single voter TMR to a
larger circuit (relative to the voter), we would see an
increase in reliability.
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Figure 1: Baseline 8-bit Counter Designs
Next, we report the baseline benchmark for reliability. With no redundancy, the simple counter
has 446 sensitive configuration bits. In other words,
there are 446 specific bits in the configuration bitstream that will cause this circuit to fail (or 58 sensitive configuration bits per LUT). The extra logic
required by the second counter design makes it more
sensitive to configuration upsets. The SEU simulator identified 463 sensitive configuration bits in this
more complex design (or 46 sensitive configuration
bits per LUT).

Counter
Figure 2: 8-bit Counter with TMR and One Voter

B. TMR with 3 Voters
We can improve the reliability of this first TMR
approach by triplicating the voters (Figure 3). Using three voters removes the single-point of failure
found in the previous approach. Table 1 shows that

this approach significantly reduces the configuration
sensitivity of the design. However, using TMR with
three voters consumes significantly more logic resources and is slightly slower than the non-redundant
circuit. More specifically, when hardened this way,
the design requires about six times more resources
than the non-redundant counter. Improved reliability comes at the cost of additional hardware resources
and slower operating speed.
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the cost of area, but it comes at the cost of speed.
Due to the additional logic within the feedback path,
the feedback TMR method runs 30% slower than the
non-redundant counter.
Strategic mapping techniques can be used to significantly reduce the logic resources of the feedback
TMR incrementer circuit. Specifically, a single-bit
voter circuit can be merged with the increment logic
in a single LUT (see Figure 5). This technique produces the voting logic at no additional cost. Further,
the feedback delay is reduced relative to the nonmapped counter circuit. In this special case, redundancy comes at a cost of only three times the original
circuit size.
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Figure 3: 8-bit Counter with TMR and 3 Voters
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C. Feedback TMR
Up to this point, the hardening techniques discussed all suffer from resynchronization problems. If
a faulty counter is repaired through bitstream scrubbing, the repaired counter will not be synchronized
with the other two counters. This problem can be
prevented by placing the voting circuitry within the
feedback path of the circuit[6]. Placing voters within
the feedback path of the counters can be seen in Figure 4. When the voters are put within the feedback
path of the circuitry, synchronization errors are prevented, regardless of where the configuration upset
occurs.
Table 1 shows that feedback TMR significantly increases the reliability of the counters while consuming the same number of resources as conventional 3Voter TMR. Increased reliability does not come at
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Figure 4: 8-bit Counter with Feedback TMR
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Figure 5: Incrementer with Mapped Feedback TMR
Unfortunately, this mapping technique is not always possible. Circuits which include more logic
than a simple incrementer cannot take advantage of
this mapping technique. In general, if the circuit requires more than two LUT inputs, the voter cannot
be merged with the design into a single LUT. The
complex counter for example, requires four LUT inputs, thus the merged-voter mapping technique cannot be applied. The six times cost associated with a
3-voter feedback TMR applies to these more complex
circuits.

V Architectural TMR Techniques
The reliability of TMR methods discussed can be
improved with additional architectural techniques.
At this point, none of the TMR styles has been able
to provide an absolutely reliable design (i.e. completely eliminating all sensitive configuration bits).
By triplicating the global clock this goal can be
reached. In addition to clock replication, TBUF voters can be used rather than LUT voters to reduce the
logic resource requirements of the circuit.

Table 1: Evaluation of TMR on 8-bit Counters
Design
(single clock)
No Redundancy
1 Voter
3 Voters
Feedback
Map Feedback

Simple Incrementer
LUTs
Failures Speed (MHz)
8
446
220
35 (∼4x)
410
217 (99%)
51 (∼6x)
14
199 (91%)
51 (∼6x)
14
160 (73%)
27 (∼3x)
15
194 (88%)

A. Triplicated Clocks
In order to improve the reliability of the different
TMR styles, we triplicate the clock in each of the
TMR styles (Figure 6). Using three clocks eliminates
the single point of failure in the single clock domain.
The results of triplicating the clock in each design
are reported in Table 2. The most important result
from this table is that all sensitive configuration bits
have been removed from the design. In other words,
no single-bit configuration bit upset will cause the
design to fail. This result demonstrates that it is
possible to make a counter design ’immune’ to single
event upsets.

Up/Down Loadable Counter
LUTs
Failures Speed (MHz)
10
463
220
41 (∼4x)
484
217 (99%)
57 (∼6x)
14
213 (97%)
57 (∼6x)
15
157 (72%)
N/A

Each of the TMR styles were implemented with
both LUT and TBUF voters. As expected, the
designs which used TBUF voters consumed fewer
LUTs. However, a TBUF voter requires three
TBUFs per bit while one a single LUT voter is required for each voter bit. A major difference between
LUT and TBUF voters is design speed. Feedback
TMR designs which use TBUF voters run at half the
speed of TMR designs using LUT voters (see Table
3).
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Figure 6: Resilient Counter Design
Although triplicating the clock can bring the number of sensitive configuration bits to zero, it comes
at a cost. Triplicating the clock requires the use of
three of the four Virtex global clock buffers and may
increase the power consumption.

B. LUT Voters vs. TBUF Voters
The TMR voting can be implemented with Virtex
TBUFs instead of LUT logic[6]. The TBUF voter
shown in Figure 7(b) drives an active low when all
three of its inputs or two out of three of its inputs
are low. When all three of the inputs are high, the
tristate buffers are disabled and the pull-up resistor
pulls the output signal high. When two of the inputs
are high, the pull-up resistor is also pulls a high signal
to the output. Thus the TBUF voter produces the
same results as the LUT voter.

VI Conclusion
This paper evaluates the performance of several
TMR design hardening techniques. The results reported in Tables 1-3 indicate that significant improvements in reliability can be made using appropriate redundancy techniques. Both the three voter
TMR and feedback TMR styles can be used to eliminate all sensitive configuration bits. The mapped
feedback TMR style proves to be the most effective
TMR method. Using TMR in the feedback path of
the 8-bit counters and triplicating the global clock
reduces the number of configuration bits sensitive to
single event upsets to zero and as well as eliminating resynchronization problems. In some cases, the
mapped feedback TMR style allows us to pack the
voter into the same LUTs as the counter. In most
cases however, a completely resilient design comes at
a much greater cost.

Table 2: Evaluation of Triplicated clocks and TMR on 8-bit Counters

Design
3 Voters
Feedback
Map Feedback

Simple Incrementer
Failures Speed (MHz)
0
201 (91%)
0
167 (76%)
0
204 (93%)

Up/Down Loadable Counter
Failures
Speed (MHz)
0
218 (99%)
0
158 (72%)
N/A

Table 3: Evaluation of TBUF Voters with TMR on 8-bit Counters

Design
1 Voter
3 Voters
3 Voters, 3 Clk

Feedback
Feedback, 3 Clk

Map Feedback
Map Feedback, 3 Clk

Simple Incrementer
LUTs
Failures Speed (MHz)
27 (∼3x)
293
219 (100%)
27 (∼3x)
14
219 (100%)
27 (∼3x)
0
219 (100%)
27 (∼3x)
19
106 (48%)
27 (∼3x)
0
123 (56%)
27 (∼3x)
19
105 (48%)
27 (∼3x)
0
123 (56%)

In the future we will evaluate the power consumption costs of these TMR styles and investigate the
impact of TMR on other architectural features.
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